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4 Position regarding fundamental civil procedural rights in South Africa
4.1 Constitutional recognition of fundamental rights 
Before the constitutional dispensation, South African civil procedural law followed 
essentially the same approach as the English model, to which it owes its origin. 
This meant that the fundamental rights or guarantees of civil litigants were not 
constitutionally protected or even embodied in legislation.198 However, when the 
South African interim constitution of 1993 came into operation in 1994, it constituted 
a dramatic break with the past.199 As observed before, “it marked the birth of a 
new constitutional dispensation based on the supremacy of the constitution and 
equality for all”.200 The interim constitution contained a chapter on fundamental 
rights201 and it recognised a few civil procedural guarantees, including the right of 
“access to court”202 and the right to “equality before the law”.203 The Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, amplified the protection accorded to civil 
litigants by specifically entrenching more fundamental civil procedural rights.204 
The constitution broke new ground by giving recognition not only to the traditional 
basic human rights and freedoms but also to fundamental procedural rights in both 
criminal and civil proceedings. In addition the constitution provides for the judicial 
review of legislation, meaning that the courts are empowered to test if legislation is 
consistent with the constitution and to invalidate provisions failing to pass muster.205 
The South African civil procedural system is therefore clearly aligned with the third 
approach to the recognition of fundamental rights discussed in paragraph 2.1.3 of 
part 1 of this article. 
Section 34 of the constitution lays the foundation for the constitutional protection 
of civil litigants’ fundamental procedural rights. It provides that “[e]veryone has 
the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided 
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in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum”. This provision thus gives recognition to four 
fundamental rights, viz the right of access to justice, the right to a determination by 
an independent and impartial judge, the right to a public trial and, finally, the right 
to a fair trial.206
In Road Accident Fund v Mdeyide207 the constitutional court emphasised the 
importance of the right of access to a court entrenched in section 34 by stating: 
“The fundamental right of access to courts is essential for constitutional democracy under the rule 
of law. In order to enforce one’s rights under the Constitution, legislation and the common law, 
everyone must be able to have a dispute that can be resolved by the application of law, decided by a 
court. The right of access to courts is thus protected in the Constitution.”208 
The meaning of the right to access to justice and the other core rights contained in 
section 34 has been considered before.209 Suffice therefore to say that, in the authors’ 
view, the rights referred to above constitute the foundation of the entire civil process. 
The right to a fair trial is especially important because it “constitutes the very core 
of procedural justice in civil litigation and provides the basis for other more specific 
guarantees”.210 Rights that are encapsulated under a fair trial include the right to be 
heard (audi alteram partem), the right to equality, the right to legal representation 
and the right to a reasoned decision.211 In the authors’ view the fundamental rights 
entrenched in section 34 of the constitution and other related constitutional rights, 
such as the right to freedom and security of the person212 and the right to equality,213 
have by now become embedded in the South African civil justice system. Case law 
bears testimony to this phenomenon.214 
The issue that begs consideration is whether South Africa is on a good path 
regarding the protection of civil litigants’ fundamental rights or whether there is 
reason for concern. More specifically, the question is what impact the exercise 
of judicial case management powers and the pursuance of alternative dispute 
resolution have on the fundamental procedural rights of civil litigants. After noting 
that South Africa had been slow to transition to judicial case management and to 
embrace alternative dispute resolution, especially when compared to the Australian 
approach,215 the authors concluded in 2018:
“[T]here are marked differences in respect of these jurisdictions’ judicial approaches to case 
management and alternative dispute resolution. In Australia, the courts’ case management powers 
are regulated by legislation and court rules. In South Africa, judicial case management remains 
largely unregulated and dependent upon the exercise of the South African superior courts’ inherent 
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jurisdiction. There is no statute or court rule that deals specifically with judicial case management 
in the superior courts. Further, Australian courts are generally afforded the power to minimise the 
adjudication of civil cases by diverting them to a process of alternative dispute resolution, especially 
mediation. Conversely, South African superior courts do not possess the power to compel parties to 
engage in alternative dispute resolution, including mediation.”216
However, if recent proposed amendments to the rules regulating proceedings in 
the high court of South Africa are anything to go by, then a sea change in South 
African civil procedural law seems imminent. The proposed amendments, which 
are considered in more detail below, entail the introduction of mediation and 
comprehensive case management in civil proceedings in the high court through an 
amendment of the uniform rules. Indeed, there are big changes afoot. Could these 
changes have the effect of adversely impacting on the fundamental rights of civil 
litigants? The following part of this paper will accordingly consider the nature of the 
proposed mediation and case management provisions and the extent to which they 
could impact upon civil litigants’ fundamental rights. In concluding this part of the 
article an opinion will be expressed on whether there should be cause for concern 
regarding the protection afforded to such rights in South Africa.
4.2 Mediation   
In recent times there has been a noticeable shift in South Africa from courtroom 
adjudication to embracing alternative modes of dispute resolution, specifically 
mediation. The department of justice and correctional services published court-
annexed mediation rules and launched court-annexed mediation pilot court sites 
across the country from 1 December 2014.217 The mediation rules provide the 
procedure for the voluntary submission of civil disputes to mediation in selected 
magistrates’ courts.218 The mediation rules were introduced in the form of 
amendments to the rules regulating the conduct of proceedings of South African 
magistrates’ courts.219 The primary objectives of the mediation rules are to assist 
case-flow management in the reduction of disputes appearing before court and to 
promote access to justice.220
Parties to litigation instituted in a South African superior court can generally 
agree to submit the dispute to private mediation. There is no form of institutionalised 
mediation that provides for voluntary or mandatory mediation of disputes in our 
superior courts, as is the case with court-annexed mediation in our lower courts. 
Currently, rule 37(6)(d) of the uniform rules provides that the minutes of the pre-
trial conference must reflect “whether any issue has been referred by the parties for 
mediation, arbitration or decision by a third party and on what basis it has been so 
referred”.221 As mentioned, the position is about to change. 
The Rules Board for Courts of Law proposes to introduce a new rule into the 
uniform rules – rule 41A – to regulate the procedure for referral to mediation of 
cases in the high court.  According to the rules board, unlike the above-mentioned 
mediation rules in the magistrates’ courts, the mediation contemplated for cases in 
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the high court is not intended to be court-annexed. According to the rules board, 
“[t]he proposed new rule is intended to facilitate mediation contemplated by the 
parties, or recommended by the court and to provide the procedure for referral to 
mediation in terms of rule 37(6)(d) (pre-trial conference) and rule 37A(10) (judicial 
case management)”.222
The proposed rule 41A requires parties, when issuing a summons or an application 
or delivering a plea or an answering affidavit, to indicate whether they consider 
mediation to be possible. The parties must also provide reasons for whether or 
not they consider the dispute capable of being mediated.223 Rule 41A(3)(b) further 
provides that “[a] Judge, or a Case Management Judge referred to in rule 37A or the 
court may at any stage before judgment direct the parties to consider referral of a 
dispute to mediation, whereupon the parties may agree to refer the dispute or any 
aspect thereof to mediation”.224 
The authors support the idea of voluntary mediation as a dispute resolution method 
supplementary to courtroom adjudication. Mediation is a valuable case management 
tool, even when it fails to lead to immediate settlement of the dispute.225 Where it 
does not result in settlement of the dispute, mediation may nevertheless have value 
in the sense that it may, for example, result in a partial settlement of the dispute or 
provide a party with valuable information of the other party’s case.226 Mediating 
disputes may also have the effect of relieving our superior courts’ high caseload, as 
well as shielding the parties and the courts from the high costs and delays generally 
involved in civil litigation.227 
At the same time, the important role of the high court of South Africa as an 
institution of governance should not be diminished in order to pursue alternative 
dispute resolution methods, such as mediation, at all costs. It may negatively 
affect the evolution of South African law.228 Our courts should also not dilute the 
constitutional right of the parties to present their cases to a court for a judicial 
determination. In other words, the right of the parties to their day in court should 
not become a hollow guarantee.229 For these reasons, and other reasons mentioned 
before, a relentless drive to replace trials with mediation cannot be supported.230
The authors’ primary concern regarding the implementation of proposed rule 
41A relates to sub-rule (9), which currently provides as follows: 
222 Daya “Proposed uniform rule 41A: mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism” (https://www.
lssa.org.za/upload/files/General/Rules%20Board%20letter%20Uniform%20Rule%2041A%20
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to be delivered by 28 Feb 2019. R 37A has not yet been implemented. The proposed r 37A is discussed 
in paragraph 4.3 below.
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Sherman and Peppet Processes of Dispute Resolution  The Role of Lawyers (2006) 305-308; Greer 
Practitioner’s Guide to Class Actions (2010) 688; Kuhner “Court-connected mediation compared: the 
cases of Argentina and the United States” 2005 ILSA J Int’l & Comp L 2; Kratz “Alternative dispute 
resolution in complex litigation” 1988-1989 UMKC L Rev 841.
226 Melnick “The mediation of securities class action suits: a panel discussion hosted by the Benjamin N. 
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“(a)   The parties may agree amongst them how the costs of the mediation proceedings are to be borne: 
Provided that any party may, prior to an agreement to mediate, offer or undertake to pay the 
mediation costs in full or the portion due by the other party;
(b)   The court may, at the trial or hearing of a matter which has been referred to mediation and where 
the parties have not been able to reach agreement on the liability for the costs of the mediation 
proceedings, make an appropriate order for such costs; 
(c)   In considering an appropriate order for costs the court may have regard to the notices referred to 
in subrule (2) and any party shall be entitled to bring such notices to the attention of the court.”
In terms of proposed rule 41A, a civil litigant who barely has sufficient means 
to access the South African superior court system must, in the absence of an 
undertaking by the opposing party to bear full responsibility for the payment of 
mediation costs, also assume this additional payment obligation. This adds to the 
already prohibitory costs associated with superior court litigation and potentially 
limits the fundamental right that a civil litigant possesses to approach a court to 
settle a justiciable dispute. 
The provision in the proposed rule 41A that allows a party to refuse to agree to 
pay the costs of mediation and for the court to make an appropriate cost order may 
lead to an increased reluctance of civil litigants to approach the high court.231 Sub-
rule 9(c) refers to “notices” referred to in sub-rule 2. These notices are the parties’ 
respective written indications of their willingness to engage in mediation. Such a 
notice must also indicate the reasons for the party’s belief that the dispute is or is not 
capable of being mediated.232 The without prejudice nature of the notice is subject 
to sub-rule 9(c).
In the recent case of Gore v Naheed and Ahmed,233 the England and Wales court 
of appeal held that it has “some difficulty in accepting that the desire of a party to 
have his rights determined by a court of law in preference to mediation can be said 
to be unreasonable conduct particularly when, as here, those rights are ultimately 
vindicated”. In similar vein Giles states aptly: “[T]here are many cases where a 
party should never be asked to mediate. The fact is that some litigants have a valid 
claim. Some have a valid defence. There is no reason why the matter should be 
compromised in either case.”234 
In other words, the prospect of potential liability by a party for mediation costs 
may have an exclusionary effect on those persons who already find it difficult to 
access the South African superior court system. As noted before: “It is cold comfort 
to assure a party with limited financial resources that he or she could proceed to 
trial if mediation fails. One process may be all the party can afford, causing him 
or her to accept an unfavourable settlement”.235 According to Bamford and Rankin 
many litigants may only have sufficient funds to pursue one method of dispute 
resolution and serious injustice could occur where in such cases a party is compelled 
to mediate.236 
Although the proposed rule 41A does not mandate mediation, the potential 
liability of a party for the costs of mediation or an adverse costs order where the 
said party refused to engage in mediation, in the authors’ view, effectively renders 
the provision quasi-mandatory. Or stated differently, the proposed rule 41A has the 
231 r 41A(9)(c).
232 proposed r 41A(2).
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effect of indirectly compelling mediation. The same could be said about the effect 
of a case management judge, in terms of the proposed rule 37A, directing the parties 
to consider mediation. Although consideration implies voluntariness, it is submitted 
that it is unlikely that a party would refuse to engage in mediation where a judge has 
specifically directed the parties to consider mediation. 
The authors argue that the proposed rule 41A should be amended before it is 
implemented. For example, an amended version of the rule could provide that the 
court bears the costs of mediation. Alternatively, the rule should expressly provide 
that, where a party has a valid reason, or reasons, not to engage in mediation, such 
as an inability to finance the fees associated with it, the refusal to mediate would not 
be taken into account by the court when it makes an appropriate cost order in terms 
of sub-rule 9(c). 
However, of further concern to the authors is that there does not appear to be 
clarity about the nature of the mediation process which is to be pursued in the South 
African superior courts. On 23 November 2018 Mogoeng CJ conducted a judicial 
accountability session during which he commented inter alia as follows:
“In order to ensure that the courts remain efficient, the Judiciary will be introducing win-win court 
annexed mediation. In July of this year Judicial Officers from all courts were trained on the practical 
implementation and benefits of court-annexed mediation as part of a broader judicial case flow 
management strategy… A pilot project will be started in due course in the jurisdictions that Mlambo 
JP presides over before proper mediation is rolled out to the entire court system, where it does not 
already exist.”237 
The proposed rule 41A and accompanying notes and the explanatory memorandum 
clearly state that the mediation envisaged by the rule is not court-annexed. It is 
unclear what the nature of the envisaged court-annexed mediation will be and 
what its effect on civil litigants’ fundamental rights will be. What Mogoeng CJ 
envisages is clearly something different from what is encapsulated in rule 41A. The 
chief justice’s comments also provide a further stimulus for the perceived relentless 
drive towards mediation as an alternative dispute resolution method. In the authors’ 
view current developments in South Africa conceivably render the fundamental 
rights of civil litigants at their most vulnerable since the introduction of the interim 
constitution. 
4.3 Case management
A judicial case flow management committee was established to overhaul the rules 
of the high court and magistrates’ courts with a view to doing away with archaic 
rules, injecting flexibility, facilitating the implementation of e-filing and judicial 
case management and harmonising and streamlining court rules.238 The Case-Flow 
237 Mogoeng “Judicial accountability session” 23 Nov 2018  9. Mlambo JP is the judge president of the 
Gauteng division of the high court of South Africa. 
238 See the discussion on case management (r 37 and the former r 37A) in De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 
26-32.
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Management Pilot Project was launched in 2012 in five pilot court sites of the high 
court.239 The results were promising.240 
The success of the pilot project resulted in the proposed introduction of a new 
judicial case management rule into the uniform rules, viz rule 37A. The introduction 
of the rule was proposed early in 2017, but it has not yet been implemented.241 
However, the proposed rule 41A discussed above refers to rule 37A as if it has been 
implemented. Further, in the words of judge president Legodi of the Mpumalanga 
division of the high court, referring to the proposed amendments including rule 
37A, “any suggestion that case flow management is not part of our Rules will soon 
be a thing of the past”.242 It therefore appears safe to assume that rule 37A is intended 
to be introduced in the near future.
The proposed rule 37A(1) states that the purpose of the rule “is to establish and 
regulate a judicial case management system to apply at any stage after a notice of 
intention to defend or to oppose is filed”. Furthermore, sub-rule 3 of the proposed 
rule provides that “[t]he objectives of case management through judicial intervention 
in the interests of justice are to alleviate congested trial rolls and to address problems 
which cause delays in the finalisation of cases”. The explanatory memorandum that 
accompanies the proposed rule 37A states that the rule is “to be applied by the courts 
with the objective of avoiding undue delay, expense and technicality and facilitating 
the purpose of these rules”.243 It is in the authors’ view regrettable that the proposed 
rule seems to place little emphasis on achieving individual justice between the parties. 
The rule applies specifically to such categories of defended actions and opposed 
applications as the judge president of any division of the high court may determine 
in a practice note or directive. It also applies to any proceeding in which judicial 
case management is determined to be appropriate by the judge president, mero motu 
or upon the request of a party.244 The nature and extent of judicial case management 
as provided in terms of this rule must be complemented by the relevant directives or 
practices of the division in which the proceedings are pending.245 
It is of course conceivable that the different divisions of the high court could 
issue directives or adopt practices relating to case management, using its inherent 
jurisdiction. However, it is concerning that the approaches to case management 
may vary, perhaps even significantly, depending on which division is seized of the 
dispute. This could arguably result in a differential impact on parties’ fundamental 
rights in different divisions. For example, a strict exercise of case management 
powers may adversely impact on civil litigants’ fundamental rights, whereas a more 
flexible approach could be more tolerant of such rights. Where a party is refused 
239 According to Daya “Proposed amendments to certain uniform rules and new rules submitted by the 
judicial case flow management committee of the office of the chief justice” (http://lawpracticeassist.
co.za/Pdfs/proposed_Case_%20Management_%20rule_amendments.pdf (02-04-2019)) a “pilot project 
to test the feasibility of the proposed expedited system has been running for the past 3 years in all 
Divisions of the High Court” and “[t]he success of the pilot project has culminated in the proposed 
draft rules, which have been circulated to Judges in all Divisions of the High Court”.
240 De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 29-30. 
241 Daya (n 239). Comments were invited by 31 May 2017. In Dec 1997, a limited form of case management 
was introduced in the Cape high court in the form of rule 37A, but the rule has since been repealed and 
its introduction was labelled as a failed experiment. See De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 27.
242 Legodi “Snail pace of litigation” 2018 The Judiciary 27.
243 Daya (n 239) and the attached “Explanatory Memorandum of Objectives and Motivation Underlying 
the Draft Rules” submitted by the judicial case flow management committee. 
244 proposed r 37A(1).
245 proposed r 37A(2). Judicial case management is largely dependent on the exercise of the superior 
courts’ inherent jurisdiction. See De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 29.
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leave to amend a pleading or to call a witness, due to some procedural failure, it may 
adversely impact upon a litigant’s right to be heard. And where a case management 
judge in a particular division directs parties to consider engaging in mediation it 
could effectively amount to a denial of their right to access to court to obtain a 
judicial determination on the merits of the case. This would be in violation of the 
right to access to justice entrenched in section 34 of the constitution.246  
It therefore appears from the proposed rules and explanatory memorandum that 
scope exists for a case management judge to adopt a strict approach to the exercise 
of case management powers. This is especially the case where a case management 
judge directs the parties to consider mediation. The authors have submitted above 
that the provision in rule 41A effectively renders mediation quasi-mandatory. The 
explanatory memorandum to the rules also provides that 
“provision must be made for a court to impose appropriate sanctions if a party does not comply with 
these rules, time-lines or an order of the court. Through engaging the litigants at pre-trial phase, 
the case management Judge can encourage settlement where appropriate in an effort to finalise the 
dispute between the parties in a speedy, efficient and cost-effective manner.”247 
Extensive provision is made for circumstances where there have been non-
compliance with the case management process. Daya explains: 
“The draft rules establish a system to facilitate the just and timely disposition of proceedings, 
with the minimum necessary commitment of resources by the court and litigants, by monitoring 
the progress of individual proceedings against predetermined timelines, and intervening when a 
proceeding is not progressing satisfactorily”.248 
Any failure by a party to adhere to the principles set out in rule 37A may result 
in that party being penalised by way of an adverse costs order.249 Sub-rule 9(a) 
provides that, 
“[a]t the hearing of the matter, the court shall consider whether or not it is appropriate to make a 
special order as to costs against a party or his attorney, because he or his attorney- (i) did not attend a 
pre-trial conference or (ii) failed to a material degree to promote the effective disposal of litigation”. 
The rule also provides that a date shall not be allocated for the hearing of any case that 
is subject to judicial case management unless the case has been certified trial-ready 
by a case management judge after a case management conference has been held.250  
A proposed amendment to rule 30A(1) provides that an aggrieved party may 
apply to court to force the defaulting party to comply with “an order or direction 
made in a judicial case management process”.251 Sub-rule 12(h) further provides that 
the case management judge may “make any order as to costs, including an order de 
bonis propriis against the parties’ legal representatives or any other person whose 
conduct has conduced unreasonably to frustrate the objectives of the judicial case 
management process”.
Of particular concern is sub-rule 12(d) which provides that the case management 
judge may “strike the matter from the case management roll and direct that it be 
246 See De Vos and Broodryk (n 5) 34.
247 Daya (n 239) and the attached “Explanatory Memorandum” (n 243).
248 (n 239) own emphasis. See the “Explanatory Memorandum” (n 243).
249 r 37A(3).
250 r 37A(4).
251 Daya (n 239) and the attached “Explanatory memorandum” (n 243) which provides that “[r]ule 30A 
has been amended to include court orders and directions related to judicial case flow management in its 
ambit”.
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re-enrolled only after any non-compliance with the rules or case management 
directions has been purged”. In other words, a procedural error could conceivably 
result in the imposition of a judicial sanction causing an arguable claim to fail. 
Substantive justice may therefore, as a result of a procedural error, not be achieved. 
Individual justice between the parties could thus be exiled in favour of a strict 
exercise of a court’s case management powers, which could adversely impact upon 
a civil litigant’s fundamental right to present his or her case to court. As mentioned 
previously herein, what about a party’s right to present his or her case fully and 
obtain a judicial determination on the merits? Surely, rule compliance should not 
become an end in itself. It should instead be a means to an end, viz to achieve justice 
on the merits in a given dispute between parties.
4.4 A call for caution
As mentioned above, mediation has many potential benefits. McGuire states the 
following regarding the success rate of mediation and the benefits that it could provide:
“Mediation enjoys a high success rate. Most cases settle during or shortly after mediation, regardless 
at what point in the litigation life cycle mediation is used. It is generally acknowledged that in many 
cases, even if the mediation is not successful in settling the entire case, the process may help the 
parties to focus on the issues that are truly in dispute and narrow the scope of needed discovery, 
saving significant legal expenses.”252 
Case management similarly has many potential benefits. It is aimed at facilitating 
the achievement of justice in a speedy and cost-effective manner. This aim is not 
facilitated by unfettered party control because the legal representatives generally 
act in the interests of their own clients. For example, in some cases it may be in a 
party’s interests to delay the proceedings or to engage in procedural disputes.253 As 
remarked before: 
“It is ... in the interest of effective access to justice to restrict the principle of party control by 
providing for a certain degree of judicial control … [P]erhaps the exigencies of the present day South 
African society demand that the principle of case management be fully accepted as a necessary 
feature of civil litigation.”254 
This philosophy has clearly now taken firm root in South Africa and this 
development is to be welcomed. However, in the authors’ view case management 
powers should always be exercised within certain limits, which give due recognition 
to the fundamental procedural rights of the parties.
The aim of mediation is settlement. However, one can assume that the South 
African civil justice system, in line with civil justice systems internationally, is 
aimed at achieving justice between the parties to a suit. Although in certain cases 
mediation may achieve a just outcome, it is less likely for mediation to produce 
such a result where it is directly or indirectly mandated. This paper argues that rule 
41A in its current form indirectly compels mediation. Furthermore, when a dispute 
remains unresolved following engagement in mediation, Vettori is to the point in 
stating that the mediation process “is nothing more than an extra step exacerbating 
the traditional obstacles to access to justice associated with a judicial system. 
252 McGuire “Mediation mandate: refusing to mediate becoming more difficult on both sides of Atlantic” 
2002-2003 Disp Resol Mag 17 18.
253 Morabito “Judicial supervision of individual settlements with class members in Australia, Canada and 
the United States 2003 Texas International Law Journal 663 672.
254 De Vos (n 198) 458-459.
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In the event that unwilling participants in a mandatory mediation process reach 
settlement, there is no guarantee that the settlement is fair or just. This cannot be 
access to justice.”255 Vettori also states that “where settlement is indirectly compelled 
by allowing a subsequent court to impose costs on a party whom it believes was 
unreasonable in its unwillingness to settle, the process of mediation cannot be said 
to improve access to justice”.256 The authors fully endorse these sentiments.
In Thint Holdings (Southern Africa) (Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions; Zuma v National Director of Public Prosecutions257 it was held 
that the right of access to courts exists to ensure that litigants who have suffered 
violation of their rights are not barred by procedural, legal or other obstacles from 
obtaining just and equitable relief from the courts. An over-zealous exercise by a 
judge of his or her case management powers could also result in an infringement of 
the right of access to courts. Too much unrestrainable power in the context of case 
management should be a cause for concern for various reasons. The managerial 
judge may, for example, through decisions taken during the pre-trial phase of civil 
litigation, “effectively fix both the character and outcome of the case” and those 
decisions may be immune from appeal or review.258 Even if they are appealable or 
reviewable, the costs that may be incurred in pursuing such an appeal or review are 
likely to deter parties from challenging the decisions taken by a managerial judge.259 
Similarly, the proposed implementation of a quasi-mandatory mediation regime in 
the South African superior court system could conceivably be perceived by civil 
litigants to constitute an unreasonable obstacle to obtaining access to a court. 
Compelling grounds would need to exist to justify a limitation of a civil litigant’s 
fundamental rights, including the right of access to court. In Lesapo v North West 
Agricultural Bank the constitutional court held that: 
“The right of access to court was foundational to the stability of an orderly society. It ensured the 
peaceful, regulated and institutionalised resolution of disputes, without resort being had to self help. 
The access to court guarantee was of cardinal importance. It was a bulwark against vigilantism, and 
the chaos and anarchy which it caused. Very powerful considerations would be required before a 
limitation of it could be found to be reasonable and justifiable.”260
It is against the above background that one should also take account of the overall 
context within which the right of access to court operates. Genn explains aptly: 
“[T]he civil justice system is a public good that serves more than private interests. The civil courts 
contribute quietly and significantly to social and economic well-being. They play a part in the sense 
that we live in an orderly society where there are rights and protections, and that these rights and 
protections can be made good. In societies governed by the rule of law, the courts provide the 
community’s defence against arbitrary government action. They promote social order and facilitate 
the peaceful resolution of disputes.”261 
She further states that “[t]he public courts and judiciary may not be a public service 
like health or transport systems, but the judicial system serves the public and the 
rule of law in a way that transcends private interests”.262
255 “Mandatory mediation: an obstacle to access to justice” 2015 Afr Hum Rts LJ 356 360-361.
256 (n 255) 377.
257 2009 3 BCLR 309 (CC) par 62.
258 Brazil “Case management: the panacea has its side effects” 1985 Judges J 33 50. 
259 Brazil (n 258) 50.
260 1999 12 BCLR 1420 (CC) 1422.
261 Genn (n 82) 397.
262 Genn (n 82) 398.
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The proposed introduction into the uniform rules of rules regulating mediation 
and case management throughout the various divisions of the high court of South 
Africa serves commendable aims, as mentioned above. However, it may be prudent 
to issue a word of caution. The pursuance of alternative dispute resolution and case 
management is encouraged, but within bounds that do not encroach unreasonably on 
the fundamental rights of parties, such as their right of access to a court, their right 
to be heard and their right to a fair and public hearing. Such an encroachment would 
also adversely affect the South African civil justice system generally, especially the 
public perception that rights and protections afforded to civil litigants “can be made 
good”. Although it is conceivable that circumstances may arise where fundamental 
procedural rights of civil litigants may be justifiably limited or even denied, the 
introduction of a quasi-mandatory mediation regime and an overly strict approach 
by the high court in exercising its case management powers, at the expense of the 
parties’ fundamental rights, cannot be supported.
5 Conclusion
This article263 is aimed at examining and assessing the ways in which the fundamental 
procedural rights of civil litigants are recognised in Australia and South Africa 
and the extent to which modern reforms of civil procedure affect these rights. The 
aforementioned modern reforms relate to an increased demand in modern-day 
common-law systems for procedures that assist in resolving civil disputes in a 
manner that is cheaper, faster and more efficient. The article accordingly considers 
whether the Australian and South African civil justice systems continue adequately 
to protect fundamental rights of parties or whether there is cause for concern.
It is apparent from what has been argued above264 that there is cause for concern 
regarding the current state of civil litigation in Australia and South Africa, insofar 
as the protection afforded to civil litigants’ fundamental rights is concerned. In both 
jurisdictions there have been increased attempts to regulate civil litigation in more 
detailed and meticulous terms, which result in numerous procedural requirements 
that must be complied with to get a case ready for trial. Australian case law illustrates 
that a procedural error committed during the pre-trial phase may result in a party 
being denied the right to present its case the way it sees fit. Thus, procedural error 
may prevent substantive justice being achieved. This trend has occurred at a slower 
pace on the South African civil procedural landscape. However, the introduction of 
proposed amendments to the uniform rules, including the imminent introduction of 
a comprehensive case management rule, should remove any complacency that may 
have existed about the pace at which modern reforms are being effected to the South 
African civil justice system. Civil litigants’ fundamental rights, especially the right 
to a fair trial, appear to be becoming increasingly threatened. Specifically, the wide 
powers of case managers and even trial judges to make procedural rulings may have 
an adverse effect on the way a party wishes to plead and present its case. Admittedly, 
however, the South African constitutional court has held that the uniform court 
rules are designed to ensure a fair hearing and should be interpreted in such a way 
as to advance, and not reduce, the scope of the entrenched fair trial right.265
263 See also De Vos and Broodryk “Fundamental procedural rights of civil litigants in Australia and South 
Africa: is there cause for concern?” (part 1) 2019 TSAR 425.
264 See also De Vos and Broodryk (n 263).
265 De Beer NO v North-Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council (Umhlatuzana Civic 
Association Intervening) 2002 1 SA 429 (CC) 439.
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In both jurisdictions, case management has become an increasingly important 
feature of litigation, with the result that case managers’ powers continue to 
expand. There is also an increasingly relentless drive away from trial adjudication 
to alternative dispute resolution, especially mediation, to resolve civil disputes. 
Indeed, civil litigation in South Africa is not yet characterised by engagement in 
a preceding overtly obligatory mediation process, but the introduction of rule 41A 
is effectively quasi-mandatory. The effect of the aforementioned reforms could for 
various reasons, including cost considerations, result in denying a party his or her 
day in court. It could also diminish the important constitutional role of the courts in 
the resolution of civil disputes and development of the law.266
In England and Scotland, for example, it is not compulsory to partake in mediation 
before parties may engage in civil litigation. In England, as is currently proposed 
in South Africa through an amendment of the uniform rules,267 the courts cannot 
order parties to mediate, but they can penalise parties in costs if they refuse to 
accept an offer to mediate.268 In a review of the Scottish court system in 2009, Lord 
Justice Clerk rejected the idea of penalising parties as it would impede access to the 
courts. In the Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review, Lord Justice Clerk stated 
that “[w]e do not consider that the court should have power to compel parties to 
enter into ADR.   That is entirely contrary, in our view, to the constitutional right 
of the citizen to take a dispute to the courts of law.”269 The report further elaborates 
as follows:
“Access to the courts is a constitutional matter.  The work of the civil courts is the practical 
manifestation of the rule of law. The courts exist to vindicate parties’ rights and to enforce their 
obligations.  In our view, every citizen should have the right to take his case to the courts of law.  So 
we do not accept the idea that access to the courts should be impeded by a requirement that parties 
should resort to ADR as a first stage or by indirectly coercive measures, such as rules of expenses, 
that are directed to the same purpose.”270 
The authors share the view held by Lord Justice Clerk in the abovementioned report. 
It is also in line with various other concerns relating to the modern-day Australian 
and South African civil justice systems which the authors have raised in this article. 
In this regard, for example, the costs associated in engaging in litigation and 
mediation have become prohibitively high. Also of concern is the lack of empirical 
research which precedes reform measures aimed at transforming the civil litigation 
landscape. 
In concluding, the authors are of the view that now, more than ever before, 
Cappelletti and Garth’s warning of forty years ago should be heeded: unless 
checked, the desire for efficient and streamlined court procedures may result in an 
abandonment of the parties’ fundamental civil procedural guarantees.271 An overly 
strict exercise of case management powers by judges and an embracing of alternative 
dispute resolution methods, such as mediation, at the cost of trial adjudication may 
have an adverse impact on civil litigants’ fundamental rights, specifically the right 
to be heard and the right of access to courts. 
266  See also De Vos and Broodryk (n 263).
267 proposed r 41A.
268 See, eg, Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust 2004 EWCA Civ 576; PGF II SA v OMFS 
Company 1 Limited  2013 EWCA Civ 1288; Gore v Naheed 2017 EWCA Civ 369; Parker Lloyd 
Capital Ltd v Edwardian Group Limited 2017 EWHC 2421 (QB).
269 The Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (Sep2009, vol 1) 171.
270 The Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (n 269) vii-viii.   
271 See De Vos and Broodryk (n 263).
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SAMEVATTING
FUNDAMENTELE PROSEDURELE REGTE VAN SIVIELE LITIGANTE IN AUSTRALIË 
EN SUID-AFRIKA: IS DAAR REDE TOT KOMMER?
Die artikel oorweeg die verskillende wyses waarop fundamentele prosedurele regte van siviele litigante 
in beide Australië en Suid-Afrika erken word. Die artikel oorweeg verder die mate waartoe moderne 
hervormings wat tot die siviele prosesregsisteme van voorafgaande jurisdiksies aangebring is hierdie 
regte beïnvloed. Die moderne hervormings wat in die artikel bespreek word hou primêr verband met 
die toenemende behoefte in hedendaagse gemeenregtelike sisteme aan prosedures wat daarop gemik 
is om siviele dispute op ’n goedkoper, vinniger en meer effektiewe wyse op te los. Die artikel oorweeg 
gevolglik of die Australiese- en Suid-Afrikaanse prosesregtelike sisteme op die regte pad is betreffende 
die beskerming van partye se fundamentele regte en of daar rede tot kommer behoort te wees.  
In beide Australië en Suid-Afrika speel geregtelike saakbestuur ’n toenemende belangrike rol 
gedurende litigasie, met die gevolg dat geregtelike saakbestuurders se magte voortdurend aan die 
uitbrei is. Daar bestaan ook voortdurende meedoënlose druk om weg te beweeg van verhore en om van 
alternatiewe geskilbeslegting, veral bemiddeling, gebruik te maak om siviele dispute op te los. In die 
artikel argumenteer die outeurs dat hierdie hervormings om verskeie redes ’n ontkenning van siviele 
litigante se fundamentele regte tot gevolg kan hê.
Die breë spektrum van magte wat aan geregtelike saakbestuurders verleen word om prosedurele 
beslissings te maak kan ’n nadelige effek hê op die wyse waarop ’n party sy of haar saak pleit en voorlê 
vir geskilbeslegting. In die artikel argumenteer die outeurs dat dit ’n onregverdigbare beperking op ’n 
party se reg om gehoor te word tot gevolg kan hê. Die outeurs argumenteer verder dat die toenemende 
beweging weg van verhore en meer na alternatiewe geskilbeslegting die belangrike grondwetlike rol 
van die howe in siviele geskilbeslegting en die ontwikkeling van die reg kan benadeel. Dit maak verder 
ook inbreuk op ’n persoon se reg op toegang tot die howe. 
         
